We identify a hidden equivalence between a structural intervention and an endogenously determined characteristic intervention. In this paper we provide a general framework to evaluate the distinct equilibrium effects of both types of interventions. In the third chapter, two types of intervention are commonly implemented in networks : characteristic intervention which influences individuals’ intrinsic incentives, and structural intervention which targets at the social links among individuals. If the agent perfectly learns the state, he learns it in finite time with probability one the more patient the agent, the later he learns it. We show that there exists an optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing informa tion as soon as its most preferred action is a static best reply for the agent, or else continues disclosing information until the agent perfectly learns the princi pal’s private information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discoun ted) number of times the agent chooses the principal’s preferred action. In the second chapter, we study a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of informa tion. By the time the delay decreases back to zero, the agent has taken the decision with probability one. In the first periods of time, the delay is zero, then strictly increases and finally vanishes. I show that one opti mal information policy consists in disclosing truthfully with delay. Both parties are equally affected by the decision. The expert is the only observer of research outcomes and provides information over time to the agent.
The agent bears the cost of effort of information ac quisition and makes the final decision. An agent and an expert face a common uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of a collective decision. In the first chapter, I study informa tion design in a dynamic moral hazard environment. This thesis studies dynamic information design and network theory. Tristan TOMALA Professor, HEC Paris - supervisor.Ludovic Renou, Professor, Queen Mary University (UK).Eduardo PEREZ, Associate Professor, Sciences Po Paris (France).Vasiliki SKRETA, Professor, University of Texas at Austin (USA).Supervisor: Tristan Tomala, Professor, HEC Paris Topic: Essays in Information Design and network theory Specialization: Economics and Decision Sciences
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